



Indexing Voice: A Morality Tale
This reexamination of Hill’s “Voices of Don Gabriel” looks at the role of typiﬁcations, and
conﬂicts among them, in the process of moral self-formation and even self-discovery. What Hill
calls “voices” link evanescent moments of stylistic variation and stance to more stable ﬁgures
that can be recognized across interactions. My reading of her dialogic approach stresses the
productivity of the clash of voices. The concept of voice forms a connection between general
aspects of intersubjectivity, detailed features of interaction, and the historical speciﬁcity of
moral communities. [morality, stance, typiﬁcation, indexicality, interaction, voice]
Introduction
Jane Hill’s work demonstrates a rare ability to bring precise linguistic analysis tobear on broad questions of social existence, with a special sensitivity to subtletraces of power and structures of inequality. In this article I will draw on her well
known essay, “The Voices of Don Gabriel” (Hill 1995) to explore some of the
implications of her analysis for social thought in ﬁelds beyond the discipline of
linguistic anthropology. Hill’s essay is notable for its innovative synthesis of the work
of Erving Goffman and M. M. Bakhtin. This synthesis gives substance to a point of
convergence that might otherwise remain virtual, which she identiﬁes with the
concept of voice. Before turning to Don Gabriel, however, I will discuss the theoreti-
cal problem to which, among other things, Hill offers a response. The implications
and problems I discuss here should not be taken as self-evident. Although they derive
from background assumptions shared by many linguistic anthropologists, since they
are not always as evident to colleagues beyond the subﬁeld, this article will begin by
sketching them out.
Just what is the pertinence of the close analysis of speech for our understanding of
other scales of social life? What bearing does the study of conversation, for instance,
have on empirical observations and forms of explanation that are not wholly identi-
ﬁable within the spatial and temporal boundaries of any single set of interactions?
What counts as a satisfactory answer will presume different notions about what is the
relevant, and relevance-determining level of analysis and explanation. Presumptive
terms of relevance have included concepts of cultural meaning, historical forces,
social power and resistance to it, psychodynamics, and human cognition. One tradi-
tion focuses on the sui generis nature of linguistic interaction, rejecting the demand
that close analysis of conversation be justiﬁed with reference to a more encompassing
level or scale. Erving Goffman sometimes appears to take this position. The interac-
tion order, he argued, is “a substantive domain in its own right” (1997 [1983]:236). The
nature of this domain is such that it is likely to “exhibit some markedly similar
features” across societies (1997 [1983]:239); thus those features cannot directly reﬂect
societies at the level at which they vary. But Goffman (at least in his earlier work)
drew on Emile Durkheim (1938 [1895]) in ways that suggest important links between
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what occurs within that theater within which people are physically present to one
another and the social world that extends beyond the immediate here-and-now of
interaction.
In Goffman’s account, the work of self presentation aims at producing a smooth
interaction. The value of smooth interaction derives from the need to successfully
project one’s own face, to have it accepted by others, and preserve theirs in turn.1 To
this extent, the level of explanation remains within the interaction order. The need for,
or value of, face itself is treated as more or less self-explanatory. Yet Goffman’s own
writing often hints that the very process of preserving face requires continual refer-
ence to another domain of social order. Thus in an early piece he says
By acquiring [universal human nature], the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not
from inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him from
without. These rules, when followed, determine the evaluation he will make of himself and
of his fellow-participants in the encounter, the distribution of his feelings, and the kinds of
practices he will employ to maintain a speciﬁed and obligatory kind of ritual equilibrium.
The general capacity to be bound by moral rules may well belong to the individual, but the
particular set of rules which transforms him into a human being derives from requirements
established in the ritual organization of social encounters [1967 [1955]:45]
On the one hand, those “moral rules” contribute to the organization of social
encounters, and thus seem to remain within the domain of interaction. On the other
hand, the rules include the invocation of social roles and categories that do not, it
seems, emerge from within the immediate situation. In this latter respect, they form a
vehicle by which society imposes itself upon its members, without their fully realiz-
ing it.
The Goffman of these earlier writings often seems to understand that what makes
the rules “moral” is the character of their mandate. For the rules of interaction are not
merely technical instruments by which communication is effected and individuals
coordinated. They are “social” rules, and it is evident that in following them, the
individual is both deferring to some kind of consensus and becoming ever more
committed to it. The logic is very similar to that of Durkheim’s analysis of ritual (1995
[1912]), one of continual reinforcement, producing increasingly heartfelt conformity
to a social order that constrains and shapes otherwise fractious individuals.2
Hill has been an especially original and creative reader of Goffman, but one whose
work points us to quite different understandings of social life. In this article, I want to
reﬂect on and develop some of her insights by looking at her analysis of voice. The
ﬁrst of these insights is that we can gain purchase on large–scale political and social
questions by attending to the moral dimensions of speech. The second is that (con-
trary to some critics of moral thought) attention to morality does not require us to
ignore or play down political perspectives. And third, taking those moral dimensions
seriously does not commit us to the idea that a moral community must entail a
harmonious consensus.
Hill’s analysis has persuaded me that the internal clash of voices is a pervasive
feature of ordinary interaction and selfhood. Here I want to push her argument
further, or perhaps merely make some of its entailments more explicit, as a contribu-
tion to the anthropology of morality. The clash of voices is relevant to two central
problems for any empirical analysis of moral and ethical life. The ﬁrst concerns the
relation between moral psychology and local social norms. The second concerns the
relation between habitual or tacit intuitions and explicit moral injunctions or their
rationalizations. “The Voices of Don Gabriel” provides an ethnographic analysis
situated at a point in which all of these dimensions are in play, and none completely
dominate.
Developing the implications of Hill’s analysis, I will argue that learning how to
speak certain registers, to take on certain styles, to stage voices, is part of the process
of distinctively moral self-formation. If self-consciousness emerges out of social inter-
action, as Mead (1934) and, in a different tenor, Bakhtin (1981), suggested long ago, so
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too do certain aspects of moral awareness. Here I propose that what Hill calls “voice”
results from processes of typiﬁcation (Agha 2007, Schutz 1967). These processes allow
her to identify evanescent details of stylistic variation with enduring social ﬁgures
that link momentarily apparent features of talk to presupposable evaluative types that
can be recognized across interactional contexts. These ﬁgures have moral implications
by virtue of their role in the play of “stance.” If stance sometimes refers to judgments
that ﬂit across moments of interaction, when stabilized in typiﬁed ﬁgures, stance can
also involve values whose force is ampliﬁed by that reference across contexts which
typiﬁcation facilitates. The clash of voices both draws on existing social ﬁgures and
can help consolidate them, by sharpening and sometimes stabilizing their distinc-
tions. These processes, I will suggest, can help push a person’s tacit moral intuitions
to more explicit form. As Hill’s account of Don Gabriel shows, however, the result is
not necessarily an individual wholly identiﬁed with a stable, self-consistent moral
center. The analysis of “voice” suggests ways to investigate the bonds between
general features of intersubjectivity and the social circulation of moral ﬁgures within
historically speciﬁc communities.
From Verbal Interaction to Morality
Before turning to Hill’s approach, I will sketch a few themes evident in some other
approaches to language and morality.3 One is that some kind of moral intuition is a
condition for the very possibility of verbal interaction. Thus one might postulate that
verbal interaction presupposes some underlying commitments that would count as
moral primitives. For example, H. P. Grice’s (1975) model of conversational pragmat-
ics starts with the “principle of cooperation” that generates maxims such as “be
truthful.” Grice does not seem to have intended any speciﬁcally moral interpretation
of the principle of cooperation; it could, for example, be understood merely as a
technical device to make communication more efﬁcient.4
But the principle implies that people enter into interactions with a default assump-
tion that others should be taken to be cooperative until proven otherwise. As such, it
seems to involve mutual orientation to one another and a reciprocity of perspectives
(which are required even for ordinary social conﬂict) that might provide a basis on
which a morality of regard for other people could be developed.5
Not surprisingly, philosophical attempts such as those of Grice (and we might add
Jürgen Habermas, e.g. 1984) have been criticized by anthropologists for relying on
assumptions about cooperation, sincerity, and truthfulness that are either highly local
in themselves, or require local speciﬁcation in order to function (Hanks 2002; Keane
1997a; 2002; Keenan 1976; Lee 1992; Rosaldo 1982; Sweetser 1987). Yet they do suggest
that even apparently instrumental features of interaction may be inseparable from
human propensities to make value judgments on the basis of semiotic forms (e.g.
“quantity” of speech) in ways that cannot be reduced to the technical requirements of
communication.
Without doing too much violence to his work, we might see Grice as implicitly
presupposing this question: what makes it possible for people to enter into interac-
tion with one another, given an initial condition of separateness? By contrast, in a
tradition dating back at least to L.S. Vygotsky (1978), studies of the child’s socializa-
tion to language (e.g.,Ochs 1988; Schieffelin 1990) and of attributions of responsibility
(Hill and Irvine, eds. 1992), which do not take separateness to be an initial condition,
often reveal more strongly distributive perspectives on interaction. This is evident in
those studies that suggest the emergence of a sense of responsibility in the child, and
subsequently, any process of imputing responsibility to others, both depend on
verbal interaction. The two aspects of this claim—that responsibility depends on
something linguistic, and that it is interactive—are logically distinct. The ﬁrst aspect
concerns the role of language itself in specifying just what the action is, and who the
agents are, such that responsibility is even in question at all.6 As Charles Taylor (1985)
has argued, one can only be fully responsible for action as one knows it (at least in the
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dominant western traditions). That is, a precondition for the attribution of responsi-
bility is the establishment of what Goffman called a “deﬁnition of the situation” or G.
E. M. Anscombe “action under a description” (1957). To say this does not require us
to identify “description” with lexically focused reference and denotation; the
grammar of modality, for instance, is another resource. But it does bring out the role
language may play in deﬁning an event as being the kind of action that is subject to
praise and blame. Indeed, this would seem to be a signiﬁcant component of the social
power of metapragmatics (Silverstein 1993).
The second aspect of the claim that responsibility is linked to verbal interaction is
exempliﬁed by work that shows how responsibility for an action, or the business of
imputing it, can be distributed among several participants in an interaction. This may
occur not only in public negotiations, formal accusations, or didactic discourses
(Keane 1997b; Merlan and Rumsey 1991; Shoaps 2007), but also the ordinary and
ubiquitous ﬂow of conversation (Sacks 1974; Sidnell 2010). And as Goffman’s (1981)
pioneering work on footing makes clear, the various possible participant roles and
kinds of reported speech can be distinguished by the wide range of degrees of
identiﬁcation with, and responsibility taken for, a speaker’s “own” spoken words that
they facilitate.
Children are socialized not just to adhere to interactive norms but also to the social
identities those norms may index, and to which, iconically, those norms may give
content. For example, noble rank may be inseparable from certain expectations about
rank holders’ presumptive participant roles in interactions (Duranti 1994; Errington
1988; Irvine 1974; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984). One might suggest that the virtue
attributable to the social category depends on and is manifested in its incumbents
living up to certain linguistic expectations. Thus their verbal performances are subject
to evaluation that may have moral entailments. The interactive construction of the
speciﬁc virtue that pertains to a social category, and the vulnerability that results,
applies as much to Wolof aristocrats as to the North Americans of whom Goffman
said “The divination of moral character by adducing indicators from the past is one of
the major preoccupations of everyday life. And the treacherous feature is that “a case
can be made,” and at the same time there is no foolproof way of determining whether
it is made correctly” (1974:453). Indeed, this remark summarizes an important part of
the vast literature on deference and demeanor, registers, honoriﬁcs, and, in general,
the linguistic construction of social identities.
The classic studies of socialization and of deference and demeanor tended to treat
the norms in question as more or less given within a particular community. More
recently, the focus has shifted to the emergent character of social categories, values,
and evaluative stances. Some of this work centers on the process that Alfred Schutz
dubbed “typiﬁcation” (1967), a point to which I return below. First, a note on how the
notion of stance can pertain to the linguistics of morality. To the extent that stance is
a pervasive feature of verbal interaction, it also exempliﬁes the ubiquity of evaluation.
But to the extent stance is an emergent phenomenon, it follows that evaluation does
not necessarily depend on a prior set of stable norms. At the same time, the analysis
of stance may provide crucial insight into the processes out of which relatively stable
norms may come to be established.
Charles Goodwin (2007:70–1) deﬁnes “moral stance” as “action in such a way as to
reveal to others that the actor can be trusted to assume the alignments and do the
cognitive work required for the appropriate accomplishment of the collaborative
tasks they are pursuing in concert with each others [sic], that is to act as a moral
member of the community being sustained through the actions currently in
progress.” Goodwin is situating morality as a very basic, ubiquitous, presupposition
of ordinary interaction, the mere expectation that others are cooperative. But the
expectations may go beyond those of cooperation and smooth interaction. Paul Kock-
elman summarizes the recent tendency to see stance as “a way of categorizing and
judging experience particular to a group or individual that turns on some notion of
the good or true” (2004:129). As he observes, the emphasis here lies on the public,
Indexing Voice: A Morality Tale 169
intersubjective, and embodied character of evaluation, rather than the private, sub-
jective, and psychological. Notice as well that if stance links “the good or the true” to
the experiences of a particular group, it verges on Aristotelian notions of “virtue”
(1941).
Recalling the claim that the very fact of interaction may be evidence of underlying
moral commitments, we may ﬁnd the moral dimension of stance to lie not necessarily
in evaluation, but simply in its inherently intersubjective nature. In what John Du Bois
calls “the stance triangle” (2007) the individual alone does not take a stance, since
stance involves simultaneously people’s relationships to each other, and to some third
entity. Du Bois notes that this parallels the emergence of intersubjectivity described
by Tomasello (1999), in which young children align themselves with others with
respect to some third object of attention (see note 5). If we identify the reciprocity of
perspectives as a precondition for morality, this intersubjectivity, mediated by a
fundamentally semiotic structuring of links among persons, interpretants, and
objects, may offer an outline of a fundamentally moral dimension of interaction.
According to Du Bois’s account of stance, any two subjects align themselves with
each other with respect to their respective evaluations of an object, toward which they
are also positioning themselves as subjects. Yet the intersubjectivity of stance does not
stop there. Since it takes place in time, “the very act of taking a stance becomes fair
game to serve as a target for the next speaker’s stance” (2007:141).And the game is not
always fair, as Judith Irvine (2009) shows, the stance attributed to us on the ofﬁcial
record, consolidated over the long-term, is ultimately out of our hands. This is partly
a function of the sheer temporality of interaction. But it is also shaped by larger-scale
social phenomena such as institutional power, prevailing stereotypes, and even the
constraints built into the media of interaction (e.g. face-to-face conversation and
writing entail different vulnerabilities to being taken out of context, with different
options for correction or revision). At this point, analysis moves from the very general
principles of interaction and socialization to the speciﬁc political and historical
dynamics of typiﬁcation. A crucial link between the intersubjectivity inherent in any
interaction, and the emergence and recognition of moral types, in the form of perso-
nae or ﬁgures (see Agha 2005) is found in the phenomena grouped under the rubric
of “voice.”
Don Gabriel’s Voices
At this point I turn to Jane Hill’s (1995) account of voice as indexical of inner moral
conﬂict. Hill’s analysis is based on a narrative that emerged in the course of a
conversation with Don Gabriel, a speaker of the Native American language known as
Mexicano, who lived in a subsistence-farming village of central Mexico. Don Gabriel
tells of the murder of his adult son nine years previously, the result of envy and
suspicions that arose out of the son’s position as treasurer of a local bus service. Hill
argues that the narrative implicitly stages a contest of value systems. It pits Indian-
identiﬁed subsistence farmers who are committed to relations of reciprocity among
kin and villagers, against the Spanish-oriented world of individualistic urban
capitalists.
Virtually none of the moral contest takes explicit propositional form. It emerges
under the analysis of linguistic and stylistic variation in Don Gabriel’s discourse,
including language switching between Mexicano and Spanish, different kinds of
dysﬂuency (false starts, stutters, verbal slips, memory gaps, and so forth), shifts in the
use of tenses, and changes in intonation contour. Many of the voices Hill identiﬁes are
attributable to protagonists in the narrative. They usually appear as reported speech,
clearly marked off from the speech of the narrator. But there are also several distinct
voices identiﬁed with Don Gabriel himself. In distinction from the portrayal of char-
acters in a story, voice in this sense is inherently evaluative. It not only depicts a moral
position, it also situates the speaker in relation to it; that is, voice in this second sense
is an act of stance-taking. According to Hill, Don Gabriel embodies by turns a neutral
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narrator, an engaged narrator, an emotionally overcome protagonist (the murder
victim’s father), and a moral commentator on the events the narrator is portraying.
The latter offers his commentary to the listener through direct address, marked by
other techniques of immediacy such as historical present verb tenses and certain
intonation contours. Hill identiﬁes some voices as closer to the speaker’s own moral
and emotional center. The latter emerges in the desperate intonation shadow that
appears in the voice of the father devastated by the death of his son (1995:132).
If the formal variations in Don Gabriel’s speech display his effort to map out a
moral terrain and position himself within it, they are also evidence for his lack of full
self-mastery. At the lexical level, for example, Don Gabriel uses only Spanish vocabu-
lary when referring to the dealings for proﬁt, as if verbal control over reference could
sustain the moral boundaries his community attempts to draw around the world of
commerce. Yet even then, he tries to assign this vocabulary to voices at a remove from
the moral center of his narrative; when a voice close to that center speaks of ﬁnance,
it is in euphemisms. According to Hill, although Don Gabriel distributes the Spanish
lexicon of proﬁt among those voices most distant from his own moral center, it
“remains for him alien, and his struggle with it [is] a principal source of dysﬂuency
in the otherwise eloquent ﬂow of his narrative” (1995:108). Hill quotes Bakhtin
(1981:294) to say the words “ ‘cannot be assimilated into [the] context and [will] fall
out of it; it is as if they put themselves in quotation marks against the will of the
speaker’ ” (1995:109). When attempting to render how his son told him he was going
to town on business, he ﬁnds himself unable to come up with the words at all. We
might say that the very limit faced by the speaker’s agency registers the moral gravity
of the choices he is trying to control.
Dysﬂuency and Moral Conﬂict
Hill’s essay is of particular interest for a linguistics of morality because it is inﬂuenced
by Goffman, whose portrayal of social interaction Alasdair MacIntyre took to exem-
plify the peculiarly amoral condition of modernity. According to MacIntyre, in Goff-
man’s world “imputations of merit are themselves part of the contrived social reality
whose function is to aid or to contain some striving role-playing will. Goffman’s is a
sociology which by intention deﬂates the pretensions of appearance to be anything
more than appearance” (2007:116). But for Hill’s Don Gabriel, moral values are
precisely what are in question.Although he is clearly attentive to how he is presenting
himself to an interlocutor, the appearances he is trying to manage involve serious
moral commitments and the difﬁculties that their contradictions pose for him.As Hill
puts it, he must face that “moral choice required of the speaker among the terministic
and linguistic possibilities” available to him (1995:97). The notion here that linguistic
choices are distinctly moral is crucial. In Hill’s analysis, stylistic variations bear moral
implications ﬁrst, because they are choices among options, and second, those choices
index both a cast of social ﬁgures who manifest distinct commitments and visions of
the good, and the speaker’s identiﬁcation with or estrangement from them. But what
grounds that indexicality?
To begin with, the key moments hinge on dysﬂuencies, which Hill takes to be
indexical of points of internal conﬂict that Don Gabriel cannot resolve or stances he
cannot fully master or exclude. Thus dysﬂuency, in her analysis, is a symptom of
underlying trouble that interrupts what would otherwise be a smooth performance.
I will follow her lead in this, but ﬁrst note two qualiﬁcations. First, as Irvine (1974)
made clear long ago, dysﬂuency may also be an artful or even wholly conventional-
ized presentation of self in its own right. Dennis Tedlock (Hill 1995:143, n. 16) and
Richard Bauman (personal communication) have suggested Don Gabriel’s talk may
be a well-honed performance, in which moments like these are a masterful staging of
dysﬂuency. This points to a more general principle, that we not conﬂate semiotic form
directly with psychological state. The latter remains only that which is imputable on
the basis of socially recognizable forms (see Agha 1995:144). Second, as Hill’s own
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work (e.g.: 1985), and other literature on registers has shown, the knowledge, skill,
and authority needed to successfully appropriate a socially marked speech variation
are not evenly distributed within a community. Constraints on ability and legitimacy
are, of course, part of why a style can be indexical of a social identity. Thus dysﬂuency
can manifest a speaker’s lack of social warrants for inhabiting certain ﬁgures, one way
of answering Gayatri Spivak’s question “Can the subaltern speak?” (1988).
Hill offers us an intriguing alternative to some other accounts of the failure of
speech in the face of trauma, such as E. Valentine Daniel’s (1996) description of
semiotic collapse when people recount violent episodes in Sri Lanka’s civil war or
Veena Das’s (2007) analysis of the loss of voice after massacres and rapes in India.
In those cases, trauma is supposed to render the victim speechless because of events
so extreme as to escape all discursive resources. Don Gabriel’s failures are quite
different:
The English speaker imagines that the great problem for such a narrator might be to come to
grips with the horror of the violent death of a child. However, passages having to do with
the death are among the most artful and ﬂuent in the narrative. . . . Don Gabriel can speak
the death of the child. What resists his voice and “falls out” of his ﬂuent narrative art is the
language of business and proﬁt. [1995:137–8]
This is not the willful and amoral self that MacIntyre ascribes to Goffman’s world.
If it is not the sovereign subject of liberal traditions (see also Hill and Zepeda 1992),
neither is it the interpellated, disciplined, nor even performative subject of poststruc-
turalist thought. To the extent Don Gabriel has trouble controlling the voices he
utters, his talk resembles that of a spirit medium, who is possessed by a spirit but
does not thereby surrender complete control to it. Possession is a struggle in which
the medium always has a say. Perhaps the relation between a moral community and
those who are part of it can be thought of in similar terms. Don Gabriel’s encounter
with the moral universe is neither created tabula rasa nor scripted in advance, but
draws on the raw materials at hand. His words are not simply vehicles for expressing
a self that stands wholly independent of them, for it seems his self-knowledge
depends upon those very voices.
According to Hill, variations in verbal form offer clues to two things, the presence
of multiple voices in the narrative, and a struggle for dominance among those voices
and the moral positions they index. In choosing a stylistic option, Don Gabriel is not
simply trying to present a pleasing appearance to an interlocutor, or to make the
interaction run smoothly. Rather, the presentation of self is a kind of moral work on
the self. Indeed, to speculate beyond the analysis Hill gives us, it may be that the
objectiﬁcation of moral possibilities, through such means as staging different voices,
plays a critical role in the development of self-knowledge. This may constitute a
discovery process by which the speaker comes to realize which moral ﬁgures he will
become committed to.
But because the discursive resources on which the speaker draws are inherently
dialogic in two senses—they both juxtapose social possibilities, and are addressed to
other voices—work on the self cannot easily be a single-minded process.According to
Hill, Don Gabriel tries to establish a coherent moral position among conﬂicting ways
of speaking, weighted with contradictory ideologies, by distributing them. For
example, he cannot simply eliminate the presence of the voices of the proﬁt-seekers—
among other things, he would be unable to account for his own son’s actions—but he
can locate them as far as possible from the voices most closely identiﬁed with himself.
Yet these voices continue to interrupt his efforts at control. For just as he participates
in a social world that includes proﬁt-seeking, and is not a wholly monolithic moral
actor as the idealized portrayal of the egalitarian farmer would have it, so too the
voices that index that world remain part of his own discursive repertoire, and cannot
be entirely silenced.
More than a contingent matter, it appears that the struggle for dominance among
the voices manifests a condition endemic to social existence. Don Gabriel cannot help
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but straddle the polarization between the communal values of the Mexicano peasant
and the self-interested, proﬁt-seeking actions of the urban Spanish-speaker. The
moral communities his voices index are not isomorphic with socially bounded
groups. Even a community as small and tradition-oriented as Don Gabriel’s is inter-
nally riven, and individuals can ﬁnd themselves moving among the options, crystal-
lizing the voices that circulate in their social universe. Don Gabriel’s dysﬂuencies may
exemplify something ubiquitous about the ordinary morality of everyday life.
Given the linguistic, ethnic, and class conﬂict that marks Don Gabriel’s world, it is
appropriate that Hill draws on Mikhail Bakhtin, whose dialogic portrayal of language
evokes a much more socially and politically embroiled world than do the more local
struggles within Goffman’s dramaturgy. Developing Bakhtin’s notion that voices are
fundamentally evaluative, Hill focuses on them as means by which speakers chose
among the moral possibilities at play within a community. Bakhtin sees even small–
scale social life as a matter of struggle among distinct ideological and normative
positions, noting that
an illiterate peasant, miles away from any urban center, . . . nevertheless lived in several
language systems: he prayed to God in one language (Church Slavonic), sang songs in
another, spoke to his family in a third, and when he began to dictate petitions to the local
authorities through a scribe, he tried speaking yet a fourth language. [Bakhtin 1981:295–296].
It follows that linguistic, social, or cultural unity, is an artiﬁcial imposition. For any
given member of a community, the usual condition is to align oneself with some
positions and challenge others. This is a matter both of social or political afﬁliation
and also of orientation to morally exemplary speakers metapragmatically identiﬁable
with certain speech styles. At the most pervasive level of everyday life, this takes place
through the play of voices. But Bakhtin’s observation goes beyond the truism that
communities are internally conﬂicted, for the play of voices does not merely take
place among individuals. It also occurs within the speech of an individual. This internal
play of voices is something that puriﬁers have sought to eliminate in the name of
everything from national language ideologies (Bauman and Briggs 2003) to norms of
personal sincerity (Keane 1997a, 2002). That is, some political and philosophical
traditions might take the very existence of internal conﬂict among voices to be a
moral failing in itself; Hill’s approach suggests something quite different.
Typiﬁcation, Indexicality, and Voice
Hill’s analysis of Don Gabriel’s narrative focuses on internal dialogism. But of course
his narrative takes place within an interaction, albeit one in which he holds the ﬂoor
for an extended turn of talk. Thus this account could usefully be complemented with
a parallel analysis of external dialogism, such as how Don Gabriel is seeking to align
himself with or against his interlocutor (and, one suspects, non-present critics), the
interlocutor’s corresponding alignments, and the moral recognition they might
involve. For there seems to be a triple dialogue, that among Don Gabriel’s own voices,
that between Don Gabriel and his immediate interlocutor, and that with absent
interlocutors.
Hill herself provides examples of this interactive dimension elsewhere. In “The
Grammar of Consciousness” (Hill 1985) shows the power certain members of the
community can exert in recognizing or denying recognition to other speakers’
implicit moral claims-making by pointing to their purported failure to master the
language itself. In Don Gabriel’s case, we can surmise that his deployment of voices
arises in part as an effort to gain recognition from his interlocutor as being a good
person, and perhaps as well that he is making some kind of moral claim on that
interlocutor. At the very least, this would include asking the latter for collusion in the
construction of Don Gabriel’s own self image (bearing in mind that Don Gabriel may
himself be a crucial audience for his own moral performance). One does not just stage
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a moral ﬁgure for no reason at all. In verbal interaction, voices call for a response of
some sort, an afﬁrmation, for example, or cooperation in consolidating or gaining
recognition for the position being voiced.
For this to work, however, stylistic variations must be recognizable to the inter-
locutor as voices. That is, they must be construed as indexical of an identiﬁable ﬁgure.
But any given formal features of speech cannot be inherently indexical of anything in
particular. Indexicality is always underdetermined for reference and denotation
without some means of specifying just what, exactly, is being indexed (Hanks 1992).
Thus the identiﬁcation of stylistic features is both labile over the course of interaction,
and demands interpretation. The interpretive ability to establish just what is being
indexed is crucial to Hill’s central insight, that Don Gabriel’s voices point to possible
worldviews, and stage evaluative stances toward them. This is why any verbal difﬁ-
culties may have implications that go beyond interaction, for small indications of
trouble might manifest conﬂict between entire moral communities. Therefore, the
argument linking stylistic variation to moral conﬂict hinges crucially on our analysis
of indexicality, social typiﬁcation, and speaker identiﬁcations with voiced personae
(Agha 2007, Silverstein 2003).
As a more general principle, we might say that the indexicality which allows one
to identify the formal features of a stretch of discourse as a voice depends on a
potential or postulated resemblance involving some more durable or systematized
imagery, such as habitus (Bourdieu 1984). That is, it requires some iconicity that
allows one to identify the discourse as a voice by virtue of that voice being recogniz-
able as a generalizable ﬁgure of a certain type.7 The moral ﬁgure, as a type, is thus
repeatable and capable of circulating across—and being subject to authoritative
shaping within–distinct contexts. Once a certain way of speaking begins to circulate
across contexts and unite (to be recognizable across) different moments of interaction
in such a way as to produce the effect of a person having a certain knowable character,
of a certain moral inﬂection and socially identiﬁable nature, then it takes on the
full-ﬂedged nature of a social ﬁgure or stereotype (Agha 2007).
If Hill is right, Don Gabriel’s voices index value systems that pre-exist his invoca-
tion of them: they are not purely emergent in the moment of speaking. On the other
hand, by giving voice to moral values he is contributing to the ﬁgurations that make
them invocable. If Don Gabriel’s narrative is in fact a well-honed performance, as
suggested above, then repeating his stylistic choices may further help consolidate the
moral ﬁgures they manifest, making them more recognizable to his interlocutors. By
disambiguating and stabilizing the indexical ties between style and ﬁgure, voices
become, at least potentially, all the more available for appropriation and circulation by
other speakers. In full-ﬂedged form, variation in speech is consolidated into a style,
the range of actual social experiences is consolidated into kinds of people, and the
speech style and social type are taken to be naturally bound together. Thus Don
Gabriel’s speech manifests the dynamic of typiﬁcation.
As is common, indexicality in this case works in conjunction with iconicity to
provide it with substance: thus the appearance of the Spanish lexicon in Don Gabriel’s
discourse is both indexical and iconic of the ﬁgure of a person oriented to capitalist
values. Voice thus forms a bridge from the scale of immediate verbal interaction to
that of widely shared stereotypes and values that persist across interactions, because
for it to work as an indexical icon it must be recognizable with reference to some
publicly circulating ﬁgures or their emergent possibilities. At the same time, those
public ﬁgures only exist to the extent they are staged in concrete interactions. Typi-
ﬁcation refers to the ways in which this moment-by-moment emergence comes to be
consolidated, for example in ﬁgures that have larger time scales in social circulation,
such that they do not vanish at the end of a given interaction.
Fully realized or only ﬂeetingly apparent, such ﬁgures underwrite the evaluative
power of stylistic choices available to any speaker. The voice is the palpable objecti-
ﬁcation of the ﬁgure that has the potential to upshift judgments from momentary to
more durable form. To the extent that staging a voice is a mode of stance-taking, and
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thus involves judgments or evaluations, the stylistics of voice contribute to the public
circulation of knowable moral ﬁgures.As Bakhtin suggests, the need to choose among
the options available in the public space within which the voices circulate is itself
crucial to the production of consciousness (1981:295). A fully self-aware moral actor
would thus seem to depend on the existence of differing, or even conﬂicting voices,
and upon the possibility of moving among the different options afforded by semiotic
form. To the extent that the self is drawing on voices or the materials for potential
voices in the surround, it may be discovering something about itself and its social
context through its encounter with the ﬁgures those voices embody.
The interactive order is a major site where this process of self-discovery transpires,
but neither its resources nor effects can be conﬁned to the moment of interaction in
isolation. Interaction contributes to typiﬁcation, but also draws on the past
typiﬁcations—concretized in persistent bodily habits, familiar linguistic forms, and
so forth, detached from the interactive contexts out of which they emerged. As voices,
typiﬁcations offer up objectiﬁcations that require uptake and potential recontextual-
ization by other participants in order to become recognizable categories and stereo-
types identiﬁable as indexing something about “what is going on here, ” and “who is
doing it to or with whom”—and why these matter, something mere categorization fails
reveal. Hill’s analysis of Don Gabriel’s voices shows us emergent typiﬁcations caught
on the ﬂy. But at the same time, Don Gabriel himself may also be learning to ﬁnd his
way amidst the moral possibilities and their political consequences entailed by typi-
ﬁcations with which he is already familiar. Typiﬁcations, seen in this light, are simul-
taneously ready-to-hand vehicles for indicating stance, and media for the emergent
objectiﬁcation of moral values that contribute to the subjectiﬁcation of those whose
actions index them.
Acknowledgements
This essay has beneﬁted from comments by Richard Bauman, Adela Pinch, Elinor
Ochs and members of the UCLA Center for Language, Interaction, and Culture,
anonymous reviewers for the journal, and especially Judith Irvine. My thanks to the
editors and to Jane Hill for her beneﬁcent spirit. Parts of this essay appear in some-
what different form in Keane 2010.
Notes
1. As Asif Agha (1995) points out, Goffman’s early work was inﬂuenced by a rather indi-
vidualistic reading of George Herbert Mead (1934), since moral rules impress themselves on a
strategizing self. Agha observes that this makes unintended communication something of a
problem, which Goffman’s later turn to more phenomenological and language-oriented
approaches attempted to resolve.
2. I stress this inﬂuence in the context of this article not because I want to reduce Goffman
to some kind of Durkheimian, but because the centrality of morality to Durkheim’s under-
standing of the problems that motivate social thought helps reveal an aspect of Goffman that
has not always seemed obvious to his readers.
3. Here I treat “moral” as a cover term for evaluation with respect to some notion of the good
or virtuous, subsuming ethics (but see Keane 2010 for some distinctions among these concepts).
4. Cooperation, at any rate, should not be confused with helpfulness: it may mean just
shared orientation, for instance, agreement about what kind of activity is taking place. But, as
one anonymous reviewer of this article notes, even apparently bare functionalism tends to
presume utilitarian moral philosophy.
5. Emile Benveniste (1971; see Hill and Irvine 1992:13–14) argued that the reciprocity of
perspectives on which social interaction is grounded, derives from the mastery of the ﬁrst and
second person pronouns. Alan Rumsey (2003, 2010), drawing on Tomasello (1999) and other
developmental psychologists, has criticized this on the grounds that the ontogenic develop-
ment of verbal interaction itself depends on a pre-linguistic cognitive capacity for reciprocity of
perspectives and alignment with others that presupposes a “Theory of Mind.” Prior to the use
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of pronouns, reciprocity of perspectives is already evident in the child’s ability to point and
direct her gaze in parallel to others. That is, intersubjectivity is implicit in such basic semiotic
phenomena as indexicality.
6. As William Hanks (1992) has argued, the very deployment of spatial, temporal, and
person deixis already plays a fundamental role in deﬁning the range of social copresence or
exclusion in terms of which certain interactive moves are relevant or not, an observation that
may also have moral implications.
7. This does not mean that ﬁgures are necessarily stable, but just that iconicity can function
socially only if it contributes to or can otherwise be brought into relation to an imaginary that
has the potential to be recognized across instances.
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